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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WENDALYN ENCE, nka
WENDALYN SMITH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
LARRY D. ENCE,

Case No. 950829-CA

Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

COMES

NOW

the

Appellee

to

the

above-captioned

matter

(hereinafter "Husband"), by and through counsel, and submits the
following as his brief of Appellee herein:
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court of Appeals pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3 (2) (h) , and the provisions of Rules
3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a final Decree of Divorce and the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law in support thereof, of the Second
Judicial District Court in and for Weber County, State of Utah. In
particular,

Wife

has

appealed

those provisions

which

awarded

Husband $1,700 per month alimony from wife; including whether the
1

trial court's findings supported the award, whether the trial court
erred with regard to entering specific detailed findings regarding
the amount and duration of the alimony award, and whether the trial
court erred in finding that Husband contributed significantly and
substantially to Wife's medical school career.

Wife has further

appealed the trial court's property and alimony award, specifically
regarding what

factors

the court

should

consider

in deciding

whether or not to make a compensation adjustment.
Husband

appeals

the

trial

court's

alimony

award.

Specifically, Husband appeals the provisions regarding the amount
thereof, and whether the court's determination of that amount
properly considered Husband's needs, Wife's ability to pay, and
equalization of the parties' income.
In addition, Husband has requested that this court award
Husband attorney fees and costs on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Appellant's issues:
Point I:

Was the trial court's alimony award of $1,7 00 per

month for twenty-one (21) years an abuse of discretion?
A.

Are the trial court's Findings of Fact insufficient

to support its alimony award?

2

B.

Did the court err in failing to enter specific

detailed Findings of Fact showing how it arrived at the amount and
duration of the alimony award?
C.
contributed

Did the trial court err in finding that Husband
significantly

and

substantially

to

his

wife's

attendance at medical school?
Point II: What factors should the trial court consider when
deciding whether or not to make a compensation adjustment in
dividing the marital property and awarding alimony?
II.

Appellee's Issues:
A.

Did the trial court err in awarding Husband alimony in

the amount of $1,700 per month, considering Husband's needs, Wife's
ability to pay, and equalization of the parties' income?
B.

Is Husband entitled to attorney fees herein?
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review on appeal in this case is an abuse of
discretion standard.
adjust

divorcing

"Trial courts have considerable discretion to

parties'

financial

and

property

interests."

Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 767 P. 2d 121, 122 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), citing Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 124 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) . This court has stated that " [a]bsent a showing of clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion, we will not interfere with an
alimony or property award."

Throckmorton, at 123, citing Gardner
3

v, Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988); Eames v. Eames, 735
P.2d 395, 397 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES, AND RULES
There
believed

is no case law authority,
by

Husband

to

be

wholly

nor statutory
dispositive

authority
or

wholly

determinative of the issues raised on appeal; however, Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1996) is substantially relevant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant,

Wendalyn

Ence,

now

known

as

Wendalyn

Smith

(hereinafter referred to as "Wife") filed a Complaint for divorce
on January 5, 1995.

Husband filed an Answer on February 21,

1995.
This divorce action was tried before the Second District Court
in and

for Weber

County,

State

of Utah,

on the

8th day of

September, 1995, the Honorable Michael J. Glasmann, presiding.
Among

other

things,

the

judge

entered

orders

regarding

alimony. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce from which the parties appeal were signed and entered by
the court

on November

14, 1995.

Said

Findings

of

Fact and

Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce are attached hereto,
designated as Appendix "A" and "B," respectively.
Wife filed a Notice of Appeal on December 12, 1995.
filed a Notice of Cross Appeal on December 20, 1995.
4

Husband

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties were married on November 25, 1974, in Page,
Arizona. (Tr. at 17) . Husband was thirty-five and Wife was twentyone at the time of marriage.

(Tr. at 133). The parties have two

adult children, to-wit:

Tyson, born October 20, 1976, and Kelly,

born November 14, 1977.

(Tr. at 18, 21, 138).

Throughout the parties marriage, Husband worked full-time as
a heavy equipment operator, and has worked in that field since
1956.

(Tr. at 21, 134). When the parties married, Wife worked as

a secretary at a hospital business office.

(Tr. at 20). In 1975,

Wife worked as a secretary at the Ram Valley Consolidated School
District.

(Tr. at 21). During part of the time when the parties'

children were young, Wife was primarily a primary caregiver and
worked part time at home as a typist for the local airport.

(Tr.

at 21).
In January, 1981, Wife entered college at Glendale Community
College.

(Tr. at 22) . Wife transferred to Grand Canyon University

in 1983.

(Tr. at 22). Wife obtained her undergraduate degree in

May, 1985.

(Tr. at 23, 139).

first semester of college.

Wife worked part time during her

(Tr. at 22) . However, after that time,

Wife did not work outside the home while attending college.

(Tr.

at 23-25) . Throughout her four years of undergraduate education,

5

Wife borrowed approximately $6,000.00 for tuition and received some
scholarships.
For

(Tr. at 25).

approximately

two

years

after

Wife

obtained

her

undergraduate degree, Wife worked as an estimator for an industrial
truss company and later as a substitute teacher.

(Tr. at 27) .

Wife earned approximately $15,000 per year during this time.

(Tr.

at 28) .
Wife was accepted to medical school in 1987.

(Tr. at 29).

Wife and the minor children moved from Phoenix to Tucson, Arizona
in order for the Wife to attend medical school at the University of
Arizona in Tucson.
Tucson.

(Tr. at 30). The parties purchased a home in

(Tr. at 29) .

During Wife's third and fourth years of medical school, Wife
"hired" a first year medical

student to serve as a nanny on

weekdays while Wife was spending increased amounts of time at the
hospital and at school.

(Tr. at 82).

This was accomplished by

trading a room in the Tucson home for services.

(Tr. at 82) . Wife

borrowed approximately $49,000 in student loans to finance her
medical school education.

(Tr. at 30, 32). Wife's tuition, books

and fees for medical school amounted to $23,000.

(Tr. at 30, 32) .

Wife therefore contributed approximately $6,500 per year out of her
student loans toward family expenses during the four years she
attended medical school.

(Tr. at 32). While Wife was in medical
6

school, the parties spent their savings of approximately $10,000 to
$12,000.

(Tr. at 116, 130) . The remaining household expenses were

met by Husband's earnings.
Wife graduated from medical school in May, 1991.

(Tr. at 40) .

Wife moved to Ogden, Utah in June 1991 in order to complete her
internship and residency requirements at McKay Dee Hospital, and
the family, including Husband, moved in order to accommodate Wife's
career.

(Tr. at 40) . Wife completed her internship and residency

in June 1994.

(Tr. at 40).

Throughout the parties' marriage Husband worked as a heavy
equipment operator.

(Tr. at 134) . Husband has no college training

and his educational background consists of high school.
133).

(Tr. at

Husband had been a heavy equipment operator since 1956.

(Tr. at 134) . Husband had been a union member since approximately
1960.

(Tr. at 135) . Husband earned approximately $18.52 per hour

when Wife was in medical school.

(Tr. at 143).

However, the

company for which Husband worked was purchased by another company
while Wife was in medical school, and Husband's pay was reduced to
$14.50 per hour.

(Tr. at 145).

raise to $15.00 per hour.

Husband was eventually given a

(Tr. at 147).

Husband was required to live apart from Wife and the parties'
children while Wife was in medical school in order to continue
working at a job which provided the income needed to support the
7

family.

(Tr. at 140-141).

Husband lived in a 1965 camper trailer

in his parent's yard during the work week.

(Tr. at 141) . Husband

drove to Tucson every weekend to be with the family.

(Tr. at 142) .

Husband worked at least eight hours per day and often worked
overtime five days per week while Wife was in medical school.
at 144).

(Tr.

Husband logged an average of 50,000 miles driven in

employment every year while Wife was in medical school.

(Tr. at

143-44) . Husband attempted to find a job in Tucson in order to be
nearer the family, but was unable to find a suitable job.
145).

(Tr. at

Husband could not afford to lose his job, even though his

pay decreased while Wife was in medical school, because he provided
the sole support for the family.

(Tr. at 145) .

When the parties eventually moved to Ogden, Utah for Wife's
residency, Husband looked for employment.

(Tr. 148). Because Utah

is not a union state, Husband found that $10.00 per hour was the
highest wage he could find. (Tr. at 149) . Husband eventually found
employment, but his employer did not pay him.

(Tr. at 149-150).

Husband then stayed home with the parties' children, pursuant to an
agreement with Wife, caring for the home and children.

(Tr. 151) .

Finally, after the parties separated, Husband looked for work
and was able to find work in St. George, Utah.

(Tr. at 172-173).

Husband attempted to return to his employment in Arizona at the
rate of $15.00 per hour, but the company was not hiring and Husband
8

was unable to find any other union work in Arizona.

(Tr. at 173) .

Husband therefore earned $12.00 per hour at the time of trial as a
heavy equipment operator for Delray Jackson Construction in St.
George, Utah.

(Tr. at 173-73) .

Wife completed her residency and earned over $100,000 in 1994,
the last full year of the parties' marriage.

(Tr. at 48) . At the

time of trial, September 1995, Wife was earning $120,000 per year.
(Tr. at 76) . Wife has a written employment contract which expires
in August 1997.
hospital

pays

education,

(Tr. at 75). Under her employment contract, the
all

of

and medical

Wife's

overhead,

malpractice

money

insurance,

for
and

student loans, in addition to the $120,000 per year.

continuing
repays

her

(Tr. at 77).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court did not err in awarding alimony to Husband.
First, the trial court entered sufficient findings upon which the
award was based.

The trial court specifically set forth findings

regarding Husband's need, Wife's ability to pay, Husband's ability
to provide sufficient income for himself, and the length of the
marriage.

Second, the trial court based the award on the parties'

specific situation, as presented in the record. Both statutory and
case

law

support

Husband's

alimony

award

in

that

Husband

substantially contributed to Wife's ability to obtain her current
career level, and based upon the parties' incomes.
9

Further, this court should not attempt to alter settled law to
require specific guidelines for establishing compensation alimony
as suggested by Wife.
other

jurisdictions,

Current Utah law, as well as the law in
emphasize

determinations

in alimony

allowed

discretion

broad

the

need

for

equitable

cases, in which the trial court is
and

is able

to view

the

particular

circumstances of the individual cases in their totality.
However, the trial court did err in failing to equalize the
parties' income.

The parties in this matter were married for

twenty-one years, during which Husband provided nearly the sole
monetary support for the family while Wife was able to attend
college, medical

school, and residency, eventually becoming a

medical doctor.

Just as Wife completed her residency and was

finally able to utilize her degree to earn a substantial income,
Wife filed this divorce action.

Husband has supported Wife for

twenty-one years, helped raise two children to adulthood, has a
limited education and few job skills, and is fifteen years older
then Wife.

Additionally, Wife has sufficient income in excess of

expenses to accommodate an equalization of income.

Thus, this is

a proper case for the court to equalize the parties' income levels
through the alimony award.

10

Finally, the trial court erred in its award of attorney's fees
and Husband should have been awarded the entire amount of $3,000,
as requested.
Thus, this court should affirm the lower court's decision in
part and reverse the lower court's decision in part, as outlined
above.

Husband should get his fees in this appeal.
ARGUMENT

I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING ALIMONY TO
HUSBAND INASMUCH AS HUSBAND SUBSTANTIALLY CONTRIBUTED TO
THE PARTIES' TWENTY-ONE YEAR MARRIAGE.
Wife has alleged in her brief that the trial court abused its
discretion in its alimony award to Husband.

Wife has claimed that

the trial court's findings were insufficient to support the award,
that the trial court did not enter specific findings as to how it
arrived at the amount and duration of the award, and that there was
insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that
Husband

contributed

significantly

and

substantially

to Wife's

medical school career.
An alimony award is committed to the sound discretion of the
trial court and may not be disturbed absent a clear and prejudicial
abuse of discretion.
Ct. App. 1995).

Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah

The trial court's findings of fact are only

erroneous when the reviewing court is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
11

Schindler v.

Schindler, 776 P. 2d 84, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) .

Further, even

though appellate courts may weigh the evidence and substitute their
judgment for that of the trial court, this is not done lightly nor
merely because the appellate court's judgment may differ from that
of the trial court's judgment. Peterson v. Peterson, 737 P. 2d 237,
239 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Husband will show first that the trial court's findings of
fact were sufficient; second, that the trial court entered specific
findings supporting the alimony award; and third, that the record
contains sufficient evidence to prove that Husband contributed to
Wife's medical career.
A.
The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Were
Sufficient to Support the Alimony Award.
The findings of fact in this matter were sufficiently detailed
and comprehensive to support the award of alimony to Husband. Case
law

and

statutory

provisions

have

set

forth

the

necessary

requirements for establishing alimony in Utah divorces.
"Utah courts have held that ' [a]n alimony award should, after
a marriage . . . and to the extent possible, equalize the parties'
respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as
close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage.'"

Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah Ct. App.

1993), citing Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988);
see also Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); Roberts
12

v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Bell v. Bell.
810 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
"In light of this goal, the trial court must consider:

Ml)

the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the
ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income; and
(3) the ability of the supporting spouse to provide support.'11
Godfrey, at 589, quoting Roberts, 835 P.2d at 198; see also Jones,
700 P.2d at 1075, Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992); Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) .
These three factors, known as the Jones factors, have been
incorporated into the Utah alimony statute.

The statute also adds

a fourth factor which trial courts must consider in fashioning an
alimony award.

The statute provides as follows:

(7) (a)
The court shall consider at least the following
factors in determining alimony;
(i) the financial condition and needs of the
recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to
provide support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7) (a) (Supp. 1996) .
"Failure to consider these factors in fashioning an alimony
award constitutes an abuse of discretion." Godfrey, at 589, citing
Bell, 810 P.2d at 492.
13

Wife has alleged that the trial court failed to consider these
factors.

However,

the

trial

court,

while

not

specifically

categorizing its findings as Jones factors, considered the same,
stating that:
a.

The parties' marriage is of long duration, having

lasted approximately 21 years; and
b.

The parties' have jointly raised two children to

maturity during this marriage; and
c.

Plaintiff is 41 years of age; and

d.

Defendant is 56 years of age; and

i.

The combined historical annual income of the family

is approximately

as

follows:

1987, $51,000; 1988,

$41,000; 1989, $36,000; 1990, $36,000; 1991, $30,000;
1992, $34,000; 1993, $57,000; and 1994 $100,000; and
j.

The Plaintiff's gross income is currently $120,000

per year and defendant's current gross income is $25,000
per year; and
k.

Plaintiff's income, net of taxes, is $7,000.00 per

month and defendant's income, net of taxes, is $1,600.00
per month; and

14

q.

The alimony ward in this case is based upon a

reasonable standard of living for the defendant.
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law #13). Accordingly, the
court specifically noted Husband's financial condition and needs,
explaining
Husband's

the prior joint
current

income.

income of the parties as well as
Husband's needs were noted in the

provision which states that the alimony award was based on a
reasonable standard of living.

The court noted Husband's earning

capacity specifically, explaining the prior earnings of the parties
(and noting that prior to 1993 the great majority of all of the
income of the parties throughout the lengthy marriage was produced
by Husband), and citing Husband's current income.

Finally, the

court noted Wife's ability to pay by explaining Wife's current
income, less taxes, and comparing the same to Husband's current
income (which shows that Wife earns $5,400.00 more per month than
Husband after taxes).
Within her brief, Wife has alleged that Husband showed no need
for alimony

through testimony

or exhibits

and that

therefore

Husband's need does not exist. In fact, Wife specifically mentions
that "the only evidence as to [Husband's] monthly expenses is his
testimony that his rent is $500.00 per month (Tr. at 161), and he
was ordered to pay one-half of the approximately $635.00 per month
house payment until the house is sold. (Tr. at 19, Findings of Fact
15

#5; R. at 97) . However, Wife fails to mention that inherent within
this testimony lies Husband's need for alimony.

Husband's $500.00

per month rent is for a 25 foot long camper trailer in which he
resides in a relative's back yard in St. George.

(Tr. 161) . Thus,

not only does Husband not have the money on his own to purchase a
home, but Husband has insufficient monetary support, on his own, to
rent an apartment.

Further, Wife mentions in her brief that

Husband "further testified that if he lived in an apartment he
would have to come up with first and last months rent, implying he
doesn't have the money; however, he was given and used $1,000 to go
to golf school."

(Appellant's Brief at 18). Wife again fails to

set forth the full context of Husband's testimony, in which Husband
testified that, although Husband did in fact accept a golf school
vacation near the end of 1994 and/or beginning of 1995, the same
was a gift from the parties' son.

(Tr. 161-162).

Further, Wife alleges in her brief that the court did not
enter sufficient findings regarding Husband's earning capacity,
specifically

stating that

"[t]here are no findings as to why

[Husband] is earning less at the time of trial than he earned
previously."
required, per
finding.

(Appellant's Brief at 19). The trial court is not
statute or case law, to enter

such a specific

However, the court based its findings on all of the

evidence before it, and Husband testified during trial that he is
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a heavy equipment operator (Tr. 134). Husband testified that his
only employment skills are to operate heavy equipment or ride
horses.

(Tr. at 134).

Husband testified that there isn't much

employment available riding horses.

(Tr. at 134).

Husband also

testified that he has no college training and his educational
background consists of high school.

(Tr. at 133).

been a heavy equipment operator since 1956.

Husband had

(Tr. at 134) . Husband

had been a union member since approximately 1960.

(Tr. at 135) .

Husband had earned approximately $18.52 per hour when Wife was in
medical school.

(Tr. at 143).

However, the company for which

Husband worked at the time was purchased and Husband's pay was
reduced to $14.50 per hour.

(Tr. at 145) . Husband was eventually

given a raise to $15.00 per hour.

(Tr. at 147) . When the parties

eventually moved to Ogden, Utah for Wife's residency, Husband
looked for employment.

(Tr. 148).

Because Utah is not a union

state, Husband found that $10.00 per hour was the highest wage he
could find. (Tr. at 149) . Husband eventually found employment, but
his employer failed to pay him.

(Tr. at 149-150).

Husband then

stayed home with the parties' children, pursuant to an agreement
between the parties.

(Tr. 151).

Finally, after the parties

separated Husband looked for work and was able to find work in St.
George, Utah.

(Tr. at 172-173).

Husband attempted to return to

his employment in Arizona at the rate of $15.00 per hour, but the
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company was not hiring and Husband was unable to find any other
union work in Arizona.

(Tr. at 173) .

Husband therefore earned

$12.00 per hour as a heavy equipment operator for Delray Jackson
Construction in St. George, Utah at time of trial.
73) .

(Tr. at 173-

Therefore, the trial court had ample testimony before it

which explained Husband's decreased income.
Further, Wife claims that the trial court made no underlying
factual determination of Wife's ability to pay support.
this argument is misplaced.

However,

Wife entered exhibits which set forth

her monthly income and expenses, thereby providing the court with
the underlying factual determination of her ability to pay support.
Wife's exhibit number 17 was summarized by Husband's counsel in
closing argument as follows:
Her paycheck shows a net of $7,664.69. Her expenses are
$4,104.00 a month. And that's her expenses on Exhibit
17. Her current expenses, $4,104.00 a month. And that's
allowing for things like buying herself a building lot in
Willard of $734.00 a month.
And that's allowing for
things like $250.00 a month for clothing.
That's
continuing to carry insurance for adult children. That's
putting an adult chid through college or university.
That's $300.00 a month entertainment.
Pet care of
$200.00 a month. She has a $100.00 vacation allowance,
$200.00 a month gift allowance, $75.00 a month for
dentist. And she comes up with $4,104.00 in expenses
against $7,664.00 a month net.
She is $3,561.00 per
month to the good while her husband of 21 years is still
living in a camp trailer and can't muster first and last
month's rent to get into even an apartment.
(Tr. at 198-99) .
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Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and met the
findings of fact requirements as set forth by Utah case law and
statute.
B.
The Trial Court Did Not Err In Setting
Forth Its Findings of Fact Showing The Basis
for the Alimony Award and Further Set Forth
Sufficient Findings to Support the Finding
That Husband Contributed To Wife's Medical
School Career.
The trial

court entered

specific

Findings

of Fact which

provided a basis for the alimony award in this matter.

Wife has

claimed in her brief that the trial court failed to enter such
findings.

Wife's argument on this point consists of a recital of

the evolution of Utah case law.
Wife has set forth the following cases for the proposition
that the recipient spouse had become economically disadvantaged
during a long-term marriage:

Tremayne v. Tremayne. 116 Utah 483

(Utah 1949); Peterson v. Peterson, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah Ct. App.
1987); Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238

(Utah Ct. App. 1987);

Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991); Higley v. Higley,
676 P.2d 379

(Utah 1983); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah

1985); Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988); and Rasband
v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Wife has claimed that the common thread in all of the above
cases was that the recipient spouse took herself out of the work
force for a lengthy period during a long term marriage to be a
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homemaker and/or for health reasons and thereby became economically
disadvantaged in an absolute sense.

(Appellant's Brief at 26).

Wife's reading of the case law is skewed.

The same cases may be

seen to stand for the proposition that, when the marriage is of
long duration, in which both parties sacrificed and worked toward
the common good of the family, the spouse with smaller earning
potential

should be entitled

to long-term

(if not

permanent)

alimony.
The Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court have
consistently overruled temporary alimony decisions or small awards
in cases of long-term marriages.

Several of these cases are

analogous to the facts in this matter.
In Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),
the wife was in her fifties, had spent most of her life providing
services to her family with no monetary remuneration, and had
minimal work experience.

The Utah Court of Appeals found that she

could not be expected to find a job immediately upon completing her
schooling, and that her salary, when she did find employment, was
unknown.

Id. at 478.

alimony award.

Thus, the court overruled a temporary

Id. at 479.

The fact situation in Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) was as follows:

the wife was a woman in her late

fifties, who, while in reasonably good health, had never been
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substantially employed and had not developed any employable skills.
The court found that the trial court had therefore abused its
discretion in terminating her alimony at age sixty-two.

Id. at

122.
In Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 125 (Utah Ct.
App.

1988), the wife filed a modification petition to increase

alimony from $1.00 per year to $500.00 per month.

The trial court

awarded $396.00 per month, based upon its findings that wife was
unable to produce sufficient income for herself due to her medical
problems, and husband was able to provide support due to his annual
retirement income of $18,000.00.
The court in Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985),

held

a two-year alimony award was an abuse of discretion, based upon the
facts that the wife was married soon after high school, her primary
occupation during the twenty-odd year marriage was caring for the
parties' home and six children, she had only worked at two clerical
jobs briefly during the marriage, and had no reasonable expectation
of obtaining employment two years hence that would enable her to
support herself at a standard of living even approaching that which
she had during the marriage.

Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court

overturned the alimony award to award permanent alimony to the
wife.
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In Higley v. Hicrley. 676 P. 2d 379 (Utah 1983) the Utah Supreme
Court reversed a $100.00 per month alimony award, based upon the
wife's very poor health, the fact that she had spent thirty years
as a homemaker and caretaker of five children, her efforts as a
homemaker enabled the husband to build a career as an aircraft
welder, she had no employment training or experience other than a
few sporadic, seasonal, unskilled jobs, and due to her health
problems, it is questionable whether she could maintain a full time
job.

The matter was remanded.
In the case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) .

Mrs. Jones was fifty-two years of age at the time of trial.

She

had only performed sporadic, seasonal, and unskilled jobs during
the marriage, and, with the full consent of her husband, had
devoted most of her time to rearing the parties' four children.
She had no professional training, few marketable skills, and no
independent income.

Id. at 1075.

The Utah Supreme Court stated,

in overruling her temporary alimony award and ordering permanent
alimony, that it is "entirely unrealistic to assume that a woman in
her mid-50's with no substantial work experience or training will
be able to enter the job market and support herself in anything
even resembling the style in which the couple had been living."
Id. at 1075.

See also Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96, 103 (Utah

1986); Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 567 (Utah 1985); Hicrley v.
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Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 381-82 (Utah 1983); Rasband v. Rasband, 752
P.2d 1331, 1334 (UtahCt. App. 1988); and Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750
P.2d 615, 618 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The Court of Appeals held the trial court's alimony award was
an abuse of discretion in Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988) . The Court cited such reasons as the wife's limited
education, lack of work experience, and the fact that she had no
reasonable expectation of obtaining employment within two years
that would be sufficient to enable her to support herself at a
standard of living even approaching that which she had during the
marriage. The award of alimony on a temporary basis was overturned
and the wife was granted permanent alimony. Id. at 74.
Further, in Gardner v. Gardner,748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), the
Utah Supreme Court reversed the alimony award, specifically listing
the fact that although the wife had been employed as an executive
secretary while her husband was in medical school, she had not been
employed for a period of thirty years and therefore would have a
very difficult time finding employment.

Id. at 1081.

Within her brief, Wife stated as follows:
On the surface, the factual situation in the present case
would appear to be the reverse of the common situation
where the husband earns a professional degree and the
wife works to support the family, contributes to a
husband's education costs, provides a home, accepts a
lower standard of living, a depletion of their marital
assets, and may even forego her own education or career
opportunities, all with the intention that their joint
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efforts will be rewarded by the husband's increased
earning capacity and a better and higher standard of
living when the degree is earned. Then, at the threshold
of this increased earning power, the parties divorce.
The marital earnings and savings were used to support the
family and to meet the husband's educational expenses,
resulting in virtually no property subject to equitable
distribution.
(Appellant's Brief
situation

described

professional
doctor.

at 21).
by

This case is almost

Wife,

above.

First,

exactly the

Wife

earned

a

degree during the marriage and is now a medical

When the parties were first married Wife either worked as

a secretary or not at all.

Second, Husband worked throughout the

marriage to support the family.

Although Husband may not have

contributed to actual tuition costs (as Wife obtained loans for the
same), Husband provided the great majority of the income for the
parties throughout the twenty-one year marriage.

Third, Husband

sacrificed in order to assist Wife in her educational pursuits,
including using the parties' savings and living apart from the
family in a small camper trailer while Wife was attending medical
school and living in a home.

Wife was able to have domestic help

during medical school by taking in a boarder in the home for which
Husband paid the mortgage.

He travelled hundreds of miles each

week in order to be near the family.
(Arizona) to a non-union state

He moved from a union state

(Utah) in order to be with the

family while Wife completed her residency requirements.
not find work as a result.

He could

He provided homemaking services for a
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period of three years while the parties' two minor children were
teenagers.

Fourth, in the last year of marriage the parties'

income,

a

as

result

of

Wife's

completion

of

her

education,

drastically increased to $100,000 per year and is expected to
continue at the same amount or to continue to increase.

However,

Husband's earning ability has decreased during the marriage as a
result of supporting Wife's education and moving with the family in
pursuit of Wife's career.

At best, his income is static.

Thus, this is clearly a case in which Husband's efforts and
sacrifices helped to relieve Wife's burden of supporting herself
and the children and allowed Wife to devote most of her time and
attention to her education.
The Utah Legislature has specifically provided for alimony
awards in situations such as this case.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on
the threshold of a major change in the income of one of
the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that
change shall be considered in dividing the marital
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If
one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced
through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage,
the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing
the marital property and awarding alimony.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7) (e) (Supp. 1996) .
The language of this statute was based upon the decision in
Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1991), which states
as follows:
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When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the
threshold of a major change in the income of one of the
spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that
change, unless unrelated to the efforts put forward by
the spouses during the marriage, should be given some
weight in fashioning the support award
[citation
omitted]. Thus, if one spouse's earning has been greatly
enhanced through the efforts of both spouse during the
marriage, it may be appropriate for the trial court to
make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital
property and awarding alimony.
The trial court entered specific findings which supported the
award of alimony based upon the specific facts and circumstances of
these parties and equitable theories of marriage as a partnership.
I think that to characterize that situation as though the
plaintiff was the only one that contributed to her being
able to go through the school and to accomplish the
things that she did is not an accurate statement. The
court
believes
that
both
parties
contributed
significantly to their family life, such as it was during
those years that the plaintiff was going to school.
(Tr. at 222).
During the course of the parties' marriage, they worked
to the common good of the family unit. . . . [T]his court
could not characterize this situation as plaintiff having
been the only one to put herself through medical school.
Both parties contributed significantly and substantially
to plaintiff's attendance at medical school.
(Findings of Fact #13 (e); R. at 99-100).
The court is unable to value one parties' labor more than
the others.
(Findings of Fact #13(g); R. at 100).
The standard of living enjoyed by the parties during
their marriage does not approach the standard of living
which can be enjoyed by the plaintiff now, based upon her
income. On the other hand, during the time the parties
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lived together as husband and wife, the defendant
contributed in part to achieving plaintiff's current
financial situation.
(Findings of Fact #13(n); R. at 102).
Wife has also cited the above findings, but does so for the
proposition that the findings imply that the trial court was making
a compensation award to Husband.

(Appellant's Brief at 32). In a

general sense, alimony itself may be seen as a compensating award.
However, the trial court, as evidenced by the findings cited above,
was setting forth its exact findings explaining how and why the
court entered the alimony award that the Wife claims the court did
not enter.

The alimony award in this matter is based upon the

partnership theory of marriage and the findings cited above relate
that theory specifically to the facts of this case.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "the very idea of
marriage contemplates mutual effort and mutual sacrifice.

Yet, in

this case, [the wife] would value only her contribution to the
marriage and not his."

Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P. 2d at 541.

This is exactly the position that Wife has taken in this matter,
and it is exactly this type of position that the partnership theory
of marriage, and the Utah Supreme Court in following this theory,
have disallowed.
Therefore, the trial court properly determined that this was
an appropriate case for an alimony award and set forth sufficient
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findings upon which to base the award.
that,

inasmuch

as

Husband

had

The trial court determined

supported

and

assisted

Wife

throughout the twenty-one year marriage, the proper period of time
for alimony in this matter was twenty-one years.

The findings of

fact, and the facts before the court below upon which the findings
were

based,

provide

sufficient

basis

for

the

lower

court's

determination of the amount and duration of the award.
II. COMPENSATION ADJUSTMENTS IN MARITAL PROPERTY AND
ALIMONY AWARDS SHOULD REMAIN BASED ON EQUITABLE
PRINCIPLES, SUBJECT TO THE INDIVIDUAL FACTS OF EACH CASE.
Wife alleges in her brief that the new Utah alimony statute
and prior case law provide no guidelines for the trial courts as to
how to make compensation adjustments in alimony awards in cases
such as this.
consistently

However, Utah courts and the Utah Legislature have
and

specifically

refrained

from

requiring

strict

guidelines in marital property distribution and alimony awards, and
have rather relied on equitable principles.
alimony

statute

provides

just

such

In fact, the Utah

equitable

guidelines

compensation cases such as that described by Plaintiff.
As a general rule, the court should look to the standard
of living, existing at the time of separation, in
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (a).
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base
alimony on the standard of living that existed at the
time of trial.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7) (c) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added) .
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in

The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the parties' standard
of living is ""fact-sensitive" and . . . the court must consider
"all relevant facts and equitable principles" [and therefore the
appellate court should] defer to the court's sound discretion in
determining

the

parties'

standard

of

living."

Hoagland

v.

Hoagland, 852 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Howell
v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)).
Further, the cases from other jurisdictions which Wife cites
for her proposition that specific guidelines should be set forth do
not support her argument.

First, Wife cites St.-Pierre v. St.-

Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D. 1984) (holding that the husband was
not entitled to an alimony award from a wife who had received
medical degree because husband could support himself).

The fact

situation in that case is dissimilar to that in the case at hand.
Further, as quoted by Wife in her brief, with regard to strict
guidelines, the South Dakota court specifically held as follows:
We do not propose that the trial court be bound by any
specific formula or approach in determining the amount of
such alimony. Just as the trial court is not bound by
any mathematical formula in dividing marital property,
neither should the trial court be bound by a rigid
inflexible
formula
in awarding
reimbursement
or
rehabilitative alimony. Rather, the trial court should
consider all relevant factors including the amount of the
supporting spouse's contributions, his or her foregoing
opportunities to enhance or improve professional or
vocational skills, and the duration of the marriage
following completion of the non-supporting spouse's
professional education.
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Id. at

2 62.

Thus,

the South Dakota

court has endorsed

the

equitable standard, based upon the specific circumstances of the
parties in each individual case, which Husband advocates and which
is currently the law in the state of Utah.
Wife has cited cases from other jurisdictions in which the
professional spouse was not ordered to provide alimony.

However,

none of these cases advance her argument that specific guidelines
should be set forth, and the fact situations in each of these cases
are different from that of the parties in this case.

For example,

the court in Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 535 (N.J. 1982)
stated that reimbursement alimony should not subvert the basic
goals of traditional alimony and equitable distribution.

The

Arizona court in Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 681 P.2d 196 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1982) looked to the "individual personalities" of the parties and
refused to look to the husband and wife as "economic entities".
Id. at 207.

That court held a trial court is required to make

specific findings regarding the facts of the individual cases. Id.
Therefore,

the

Utah

courts

as

well

as

courts

in

other

jurisdictions support the principle that alimony awards, whether
based upon compensating factors or not, must be based on equitable
principles and conform to the individual facts of each case.
trial court in this matter did so.

Accordingly, Wife's argument

for the establishment of specific guidelines must fail.
30

The

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO EQUALIZE THE
PARTIES7 RESPECTIVE INCOME LEVELS IN THIS MATTER.
The fact situation in this matter is such that the trial court
should have equalized the parties' respective income levels through
the alimony award.

The trial court awarded alimony to Husband in

the amount of $1,700.00 per month for a period of twenty-one years.
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law #13(p), Decree of Divorce
#11, Tr. 58) . However, in marriages of long duration, equalization
of the parties' income levels is proper.
The Utah alimony statute states that "the court may, under
appropriate
respective

circumstances,
standards

of

attempt
living."

to

equalize

Utah

Code

the

parties'

Ann.

§ 30-3-

5(7) (d) (Supp. 1996) .
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

set

forth

the

need

to

allow

equalization of income with alimony awards and the circumstances
surrounding such awards.
Usually the needs of the spouses are assessed in light of
the standard of living they had during marriage. Gardner
v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076,, 1081 (Utah 1988); Jones, 700
P. 2d at 1075.
In some circumstances, it may be
appropriate to try to equalize the spouses' respective
standards of living. Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1081; see also
Olson v.Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985); Hialey v.
Hialey, 676 P.2d 379, 381 (Utah 1983).
Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991).
The fact situation in this matter is precisely the type of
situation described in Martinez.
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Thus, equalization of income in

this case is proper.
attended

During the course of this marriage Wife

college and medical

school as well as completed her

residency. Although Wife obtained student loans to assist her with
tuition and books, the substantial majority

of Wife's

living

expenses (excluding approximately $6,000 per year) was provided by
Husband.

Husband was required to live apart from Wife and the

parties' children while Wife was in medical school in order to
continue working at a job which provided the income needed to
support

the family.

After Wife and the children moved

to a

different city while Wife attended medical school, Husband lived in
a camper trailer in his parent's yard.

Husband supported the

family with his earnings and they were able to live in a twobedroom home and Wife was even able to have a live-in nanny to
assist with the children on the weekdays (while Husband was out of
town working) .

Later, when Wife was serving her residency, the

family moved to Utah.

Husband quit his union job in Arizona to

move with the family.

Then, after Wife was able to support the

family on her substantial income, the parties agreed that Husband
would remain at home with the parties' minor children, who were
teenagers at the time.

Husband stayed at home and raised the

children for three years prior to the parties' separation.
This

is

clearly

a

case

in

which

Husband's

efforts

and

sacrifices helped to relieve Wife's burden of supporting herself
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and the children and allowed Wife to devote most of her time and
attention to her education.
Further, Wife's income and expenses are such that she has the
ability to equalize the parties' income through alimony.
earns a net income of $7,664.69 per month.
$4,104.00 a month.
income.

Wife

Her expenses are

Thus, Wife has $3,561.00 per month excess

This calculation even allows for expenses such as the

following: a building lot in Willard at $734.00 per month; clothing
at $250.00 per month; insurance for adult children; financing an
adult child's college or university education; entertainment at
$300.00

per

month; pet

care

of

$200.00

per

month;

vacation

allowance of $100.00 per month; $200.00 a month gift allowance, and
$75.00 per month for dentist expenses.

Therefore, while Wife has

the ability to expend great sums for luxuries such as those listed
above and still has excess income of over $3,500.00 per month, her
Husband of 21 years is still living in a camp trailer and can't
muster first and last month's rent to get into an apartment.

(Tr.

at 198-99) .
Accordingly, this is a proper case for the equalization of
income. This court should therefore remand this case for a factual
determination

of

the monetary

amount

parties' income levels.
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needed

to

equalize

the

IV. HUSBAND SHOULD BE REIMBURSED FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
INCURRED IN THIS ACTION.
At trial, Husband's counsel proffered that her attorney's fees
and costs were approximately $3,000.00.
Husband

attorney's

fees

in the

amount

The trial court awarded
of

$1,000.00.

It is

equitable that Husband should have been awarded judgment against
Wife for the full amount.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3, (1953, as amended) states that " [t]he
district court has discretion to order either party to pay the
other party's attorney fees in a divorce action."

See also, Muir

v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 741 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), citing Mauahan v.
Maughan, 770 P.2d 145, 162 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
When awarding attorney's fees, "the trial court must find (1)
the requesting party is in need of financial assistance; (2) the
requested fees are reasonable; and (3) the other spouse has the
ability to pay".

Muir, at 741, citing Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d

836, 840 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421,
425 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 470 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).
In this matter, Husband is undoubtedly in need of financial
assistance.

Wife is in a much better financial position to pay

Husband's attorney's fees and has the ability to do so, even if the
same must be done on a payment rather than lump-sum basis.
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Additionally, the requested fees were reasonable.

In Muir,

this Court stated as follows:
In determining the reasonableness of attorney fees, the
court may consider the difficulty of the litigation, the
efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case,
the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar
services/ the amount involved in the case and the result
attained, and the expertise and experience of the
attorneys involved."
Muir, at 741, quoting Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988)

(quoting Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P. 2d 622, 625

(Utah 1985)) .
This was a complex case involving research, discovery and
expertise. Difficult legal issues were broached regarding alimony
awards.

Eacft of the attorneys involved efficiently represented

their respective clients.

Husband prevailed in his claim for

alimony over Wife's utter objection to paying any alimony.
Further, the number of hours claimed were reasonable in light
of the complexity of the case.

Husband's attorney has fifteen

years of experience and expertise in domestic matters, thereby
warranting the hourly rate charged. Husband's attorney's fees were
similar to that which would be charged by other similarly skilled
attorneys practicing in Utah.
In a similar fact situation, the court in Muir v.Muir, 841
P.2d 736, 741
proffer

(Utah Ct. App. 1992) allowed wife's attorney to

testimony

regarding

the
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amount

and

reasonableness

of

attorney's fees.

Husband's attorney did not object.

The court

found that wife incurred $15,000.00 in legal fees, but ordered
husband to only pay $3,000.00 of those fees.
offered no explanation for the reduction.
made general

findings

The trial court

Although the court had

regarding husband's

income,

it made no

findings specifically regarding husband's ability to pay wife's
attorney's
evidence

fees.

of

undisputed,

The

wife's
the

court held

attorney

court

fees

abused

its

that because
was

the proffered

adequate

discretion

in

and

entirely

reducing

the

requested amount from a sum of more than $15,000 to only $3,000
without a finding that the reduction was warranted by one of the
established factors.
"Where

'the

evidence

supporting

the

reasonableness

of

requested attorney fees is both adequate and entirely undisputed,
. . . the court abuses its discretion in awarding less than the
amount requested unless the reduction is warranted' by one or more
of the established factors."

Muir, at 741, quoting Martindale v.

Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 517-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Husband's attorney's fees were proffered on the record at the
time of trial and were not objected to.
above, were proper and undisputed.
establishing

a reasonable

award
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Such fees, as discussed

Each of the factors for

of attorney's

fees were met.

Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding only
$1,000 in attorney's fees when the amount requested was $3,000.00.
CONCLUSION
First, the trial court in this matter did not err in its
decision to award alimony to Husband nor in the entry of the
findings or determination of the supporting facts in support of
that decision.
settled

law

to

Second, this court should not attempt to alter
require

compensation alimony.

specific

guidelines

for

establishing

The sound principles of equity and the

totality of the circumstances

in each case should govern all

alimony decisions and therefore this court should not alter the
law.

Third, the trial court erred in failing to equalize the

parties' income through the alimony award in light of the length of
the parties' marriage and the circumstances surrounding Wife's
ability

to earn a greater

income due to her medical degree.

Fourth, the trial court erred in its award of attorney's fees, as
Husband should have been awarded the entire amount of $3,000 as
requested.

Finally, Husband should receive his fees incurred in

this appeal.
Thus, this court should affirm the lower court's decision in
part and reverse the lower court's decision in part, as outlined
above.
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Respectfully submitted this

day of May, 1996.

CORPORON 8c WILLIAMS, P.C.

MARY C £t>RPORON ' / / ~ < 7 "
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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